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STUDENT NOTES AND COUMMENTS
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF A SURVIVOR'S TESTIMONY UNDER
THE KENTUCKY DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
In a suit brought in Kentucky on a contract action against the estate of a
decedent, the testimony of the survivor of the transaction is inadmissible. How-
ever, if the proceeding against the estate of the decedent is founded in tort, the
testimony of the survivor is admissible.'
The purpose of this note is to review the history concerning the development
of the dead man's statutes, to investigate the dead man s statute in Kentucky, and
to suggest a solution to the problems ansing as a result of the application of the
Kentucky dead man's statute.
Under common law rules, a person who had a pecumary interest in a cause
of action was disqualified under the general rules of incompetency.2 The funda-
mental rationalization of the disqualification was that the pecumary interest would
cause an interested party to give perjured testimony and thereby induce the jury
to reach an improper verdict.'
The common law jurist followed this rule, evidently believing that the jury
could not detect perjured testimony when fully aware that the party had a pecun-
iary interest in the action.' As a result of the exclusion of the testimony, the
courts were ignonng those claimants who were honest, thus following the false
assumption that all men are dishonest when tempted with pecumary gain. These
fallacies, however, were later recognized and statutory provisions permitted the
party or witness to testify."
The abolition of the disqualification of persons having a pecuniary interest
\v'as not uithout sonic repercussion. In abrogating the common law rule, the
legislature created an exception to the interest precept and excluded testimony of
the survivor of a transaction in a legal proceeding against the estate of a dead man.'
The exception was created because it was believed that if the survivor gave is
version of the facts it would be impossible to expose omissions, mistakes, and
falsehoods.- Furthermore, it was hoped to prevent dishonest claimants from
plundenng the estates of the deceased."
This statutory exception, the so-called dead man s statute, was adopted by
the Kentucky Leislature. The code provision disqualifying the survivors testi-
mony provided, " no person shall testify for himself concerning any verbal
statement of, or any transaction with, or any act done or omitted to be done by,
an infant under fourteen years of age, or by one who is of unsound mind or dead
when the testimony is offered to be given, except for the purpose, and to the
I" no person shall testify for himself concerning any verbal statement of,
or any transaction with, or any act done or omitted to be done by an infant under
fourteen years of age, or by one who is of unsound mind or dead when the testi-
mony is offered to be given except for the purpose, and to the extent, of affecting
one who is living, and who, when over fourteen years of age and of sound mind,
heard such statement, or was present when such transaction took place, or when
smich act was done or omitted, and except 'in actions for personal injury, death or
damage to property by negligence or tortious acts " KY. CODES, CIV. PROC. sec.
606 (2) (1948).
"5 CHAIBERAYNr, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE sec. 3669 (1911).
"See Burk v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 219 Ky. 163, 165, 292 S. W 486, 487
(1926): 4 JONFS, COMMENTARIES ON TaE LAW OF EVIDENCE sec. 725 (1914).
'See Burk v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 219 Ky. 163, 165, 292 S. WV. 486
-187 (1926).
r5 C-AMBERLAYNE, op. cit. supra note 2, sec. 3669 (1911).
5 CHANIBFRLAYNF, Op. cit. supra note 2, sec. 3670 (1911).
I JONIS, COmMENTARIFS ON' THE LAW OF EVIDENCE sec. 77,3 (1914).
- 1td.
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extent, of affecting one who As living, and who, when over fourteen years of age
and of sound mind, heard such statement, or who was present when such trans-
action took place, or when such act was done or omitted "0 It is noticed at
the time of the adoption of the code provision, all testimony concerning a trans-
action with the three specified classes was incompetent in an action by the sur-
vivor against the estate of either. Prior to any modification of this code pro-
vision, the Court of Appeals had expressed its dissatisfaction with its terms. In
Burk v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company," the plaintiff sued the defendant
railroad for injury received due to the alleged negligence of the defendant's engi-
neer. Between the first and second trial of the case, the engineer died and the
defendant relied upon an earlier Kentucky caseu in which the court refused to
allow the injured party s testimony where the defendant's engineer had died be-
fore the trial. In order to circumvent the applicability of the statute, the court
held that the defendant railroad was present through the conductor when the act
occurred and the testimony was admissible even though the engineer who caused
the injury had since died. The court, after reviewing various legal writers criti-
cisms of the dead mans statute, stated: "The evident wishes of these great men
do not make the law, but when we consider what they have said, and remember
that each of the acts of the legislative branch of our government upon this subject
has been an enabling act, we are persuaded that every witness offered should be
allowed to testify, unless his exclusion is clearly required by our statutes."'
Six years after the Burk case in 1926, the dead man's statute was amended."
The amendment excepted actions for personal injury, and death or damage to
property by negligence or tortious acts." Available material concerning the amend-
ment fails to reveal the basic reasoning for allowing testimony concerning an action
founded in tort, while excluding testimony in other actions against the estate of
the deceased. An influential member of the legislature at the time the amend-
ment was adopted has suggested that the primary reason for its enactment was
to allow testimony of the survivor of an automobile accident, as many claims were
prevented because the surviving party was the sole witness.
The code provision as it now exists allows the survivor s testimony if the
gravamen"' of the action sounds in tort but the testimony is inadmissible if the
gravamen is in contract." This being true, in many factual situations, incon-
sistencies will result in the application of the code provision. Such an inconsis-
tency might arise where a contract cause of action is co-existent with a tort cause
of action." For instance, where a carrier-passenger relationship exists, if the
passenger is injured through the negligence of the earner he may sue for breach
of contract or elect to sue in tort for the wrongful act."
A more interesting situation arises where the tort committed has resulted in
the unjust enrichment of the survivor at the expense of the deceased."0 The per-
'KY. CODES, CIv. PROC. sec 606 (2) (1876).10219 Ky. 163, 292 S. V 486 (1926).
iIllinois Central R. R. v. Martin, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 666, 110 S. W 815 (1908).
"Burk v. Louisville S Nashville R. R., 219 Ky. 163, 165, 292 S. IV 486,
487 (1926).
"2Ky. Acts c. 59, sec. 1 (1932).
Ibid.
"Ponieroy points out the difficulty of determining the gravamen of an ac
tion. i t is sometimes impossible to decide which class of' allegations
constitute the gravamen of the action ,and which is to be regarded as surplusage."
POEIEROY, CODE RE-MDIES sec. 452 (5th ed. 1929).
16 Browns, Bell & Cowgill v. Soper, 287 Ky. 17. 152 S. IV 2d 278 (1941).
"1 PoimRoy, CODE REMEDIES sec. 458 (5th ed. 1929).
11 PROSSER, TORTS 203 (1941).
"'Id. at 1118.
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sonal representative of the deceased may choose which theory to pursue. He may
bring an action in quasi contract and although no actual contract exists, the action
must proceed upon the contract theory as a contract is implied by law.' Testi-
mony of the survivor in this instance would be inadmissible. However, the per-
sonal representative may frame his cause of action in tort and the testimony of
the survivor would be admissible under the exception excluding tort actions.
Therefore, in these situations as vell as others,"' where a tort action is co-
existent with a contract action and one of the parties has died subsequent to the
transaction, it may be contended that -the manner in which the cause of action is
framed would be the determining factor as to whether the testimony would be
admitted.
Furthermore, the exception of the code pertaining to tort actions has proved
difficult for the courts to interpret and apply.' In a recent federal case," the
court through dictum suggested that flus difficulty could be eliminated by basing
the admissibilitv of the evidence upon what the statement itself pertained to.
". If the statement was made in connection with a wrongful act and addressed
itself to some phase of tort, it seemingly is competent. If it addressed itself to
the contract, to a construction of or a waiver or a consideration of its terms, the
exception created by the amendment does not apply and the statement is incom-
petent." '  To admit the testimony on this theory is questionable. By the express
terms of the amendment, is not the Legislature concerned with the form of the
action as pleaded? The exception provides "except in actions for personal injury,
death or damage to property by negligence or tortious acts." The emphasis
placed upon "actions" would seem to refer to the form of the action as pleaded.
Moreover, in the same case a part of the survivor s statements coming within the
exception would be admissible and the other statements inadmissible. It is doubted
vhether this situation would eliminate the difficulty in applying the exception.
Due to the existing fallacies, it is contended that a definite change should be
made regarding the Kentucky dead man s statute. It is suggested that either the
tort exception be repealed and the testimony of the survivor be prohibited in all
eases; or else the code provision should be repealed in its entirety and the testimony
of the survivor be admitted in all cases. It is contended that the latter solution
is the proper one to adopt. " a rule of evidence at one time thought neces-
sarv to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding
generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or un-
wsdon of the old rule."' It is believed that two centuries of experience derived
from the application of the dead man s statute have shown the fallacy of such
a rule.
The statutes have not aided in protecting the estates of the deceased. The
false claimant, in spite of the dead man s statute, if determined to prey upon the
estate could make out a case sufficient to sustain a decision by getting testimony
before the tribunal that is not within the exclusion. Therefore, the code pro-
vision has not to any great extent prevented the dishonest party from establishing
his claim, and yet, it has prevented the truthful claimant from establishing a
justifiable demand.
To permit the survivor of any transaction to testify will not result m large
scale perjury. This has been proved in Kentucky where the testimony is admissible
'lid. at 1119.
-'* d. at 204.
'See Niles v. Luttrell, 61 F. Supp. 778. 783 (W D. Ky. 1945).
-Niles v. Luttrell. 61 F Supp. 778 (W D. Kv. 194I5).
id. at 783.
:'Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 381 (1933).
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in tort cases. The cases fail to reveal any indication that the estates of the de-
ceased have been attacked by false claimants.' It is only reasonable and logical
that in those cases where the survivor gives his version of the facts, the court and
jury will realize the peculiar situation and be extremely cautious in considering
such testimony in arriving at a verdict.
Furthermore, even though the testimony of the survivor is admitted, the
representative of the estate of the deceased is not left helpless against the survivor.
In most cases, a substantial amount of evidence will be available to the representa-
tive of the deceased. Cross examination will also prove effective in revealing
inconsistencies and falsehoods in the survivor s testimony. Moreover, since human
nature is such that the dishonest statements of a person soon become generally
evident, the reputation of the survivor for truth and veracity may be presented to
the jury to discredit the survivors testimony. After balancing the good and the
bad effects of the dead man s statute, it is contended that the Kentucky statute
should be repealed: thereby making the testimony of the survivor concerning a
transaction with a deceased person admissible in evidence.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the dead man's statute in Kentucky works
an injustice in many situations. The need for a change is evident, and in order
to accomplish the desired result, Section 606 (2) should be repealed in its en-
tirety and testimony of the survivor of a transaction with a deceased person should
be admitted i any cause of action against the latter s estate.
JOHN J. LAiuaN
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